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ABSTRACT 
In 1982, Alaska’s twelve regional Native corporations finalized and executed a 
settlement agreement ending a decade of litigation involving Section 7(i) of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The 121-page Settlement Agreement is 
complex and covers a number of issues. The Agreement annually governs the 
distribution of tens of millions in revenue shared between the regional 
corporations pursuant to Section 7(i). This Article reviews the history of the 
Settlement Agreement, with emphasis on the negotiations that led to it, as well 
as the legal challenges regarding the Agreement since its execution. This 
Article also reviews the Agreement, section-by-section, and provides insight 
from court cases, arbitration decisions, and other analysis of sections in the 
Agreement. Finally, this Article recommends that the twelve regions consider 
amending the Agreement to modernize it and address issues that have arisen 
since 1982 that were not anticipated by the drafters of the Agreement. This 
Article is a follow-on to ANCSA Section 7(I): $40 Million Per Word and 
Counting, which reviewed the history of Section 7(i). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, twelve regional corporations, created pursuant to the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act1 (ANCSA or the “Act”), entered into a 
settlement agreement that ended a cycle of litigation, which had persisted 
for almost a decade over the simple concept contained in Section 7(i) of 
the Act.2 Section 7(i), a key component of the Act, requires ANCSA 
regional corporations to share 70% of revenue derived from timber or 
subsurface resources with the other eleven regional corporations. 
Specifically, Section 7(i) provides: 
Except as provided by subparagraph (B), 70 percent of all 
revenues received by each Regional Corporation from the timber 
resources and subsurface estate patented to it pursuant to this 
chapter shall be divided annually by the Regional Corporation 
among all twelve Regional Corporations organized pursuant to 
this section according to the number of Natives enrolled in each 
region pursuant to section 1604 of this title. The provisions of 
this subsection shall not apply to the thirteenth Regional 
Corporation if organized pursuant to subsection (c) hereof.3 
The Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement Agreement” 
or the “Agreement”) is an important and complicated document that has 
governed the distribution of $2.5 billion in revenue shared since 1982.4 In 
Volume 33:2 of Alaska Law Review, tied to the journal’s 2016 symposium 
 
 1.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-
203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–29 (2012)). 
 2.  See Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (June 1982) [hereinafter Settlement 
Agreement] (on file with authors). A current version of the Settlement Agreement 
including the two amendments made since 1982 is available at 
http://www.lbblawyers.com/ancsa/7i%20Settlement%20 
Agreement%20AMENDED.pdf. 
 3.  ANCSA § 7(i). 
 4.  See McDowell Group, Economic Benefits of ANCSA Section 7(i) and 7(j) 
Revenue, 1 (Jan. 2017) (“Between FY1982 and FY2015, a cumulative total of $2.5 
billion in 7(i) revenue has been received by all ANCs combined.”) (on file with 
authors); Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., ASRC Reaches Historic 
Milestone in Revenue Sharing (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.asrc.com/Press 
Releases/Pages/ASRC-Historic-Revenue-Sharing.aspx (announcing that ASRC 
has distributed over one billion dollars to other Alaska Native Corporations 
pursuant to Section 7(i) obligations); Red Dog Mine, NANA REG’L CORP., INC., 
http://www.nana.com/regional/resources/red-dog-mine (last visited Sept. 17, 
2017) (“NANA has distributed approximately $820 million to other regions and 
at-large shareholder[s] via the 7(i) sharing provisions . . . . “); Press Release, 
Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Announces December Distribution Totaling $11.7 
Million, http://www.sealaska.com/news/item/2013-11-15/sealaska-announces 
-december-distribution-totaling-117-million (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (noting 
“Sealaska has paid more than $317 million into [the Section 7(i)] pool”). 
34.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2017  6:21 PM 
2017 SECTION 7(I) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 203 
reflecting on the forty-five years of ANCSA’s existence, we described the 
challenges of Section 7(i) revenue-sharing and how the Settlement 
Agreement had resolved contentious litigation among Native 
Corporations. This Article provides a more detailed description of the 
Settlement Agreement itself by providing a section-by-section analysis of 
the Agreement. After describing the Settlement Agreement’s history,5 the 
Article then reviews the two amendments to the Settlement Agreement 
since 1982. Next, the Article conducts a complete sectional analysis of the 
Agreement and reviews several legal challenges made against the 
Agreement since its execution. The Article concludes with an analysis of 
the possible amendments to the current version of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
I. HISTORY OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The simplicity of the original language of Section 7(i), and the lack of 
implementing regulations, led to a decade of litigation between the 
regional corporations.6 Aided by the Special Master appointed by court 
order in Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. (Aleut II)7 to assist in 
managing the complex, multi-party litigation, the leaders of the ANCSA 
regional corporations recognized the futility and extraordinary cost of 
constant and ongoing litigation.8 Complications were exacerbated by 
 
 5.  For a more detailed review of the history of Section 7(i), see Aaron M. 
Schutt, ANCSA Section 7(I): $40 Million Per Word and Counting, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 
229, 231–37 (2016). 
 6.  See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53 (D. 
Alaska 1975) (six decisions from this docket are discussed infra); Doyon, Ltd. v. 
NANA Reg’l. Corp. (Doyon v. NANA), No. 1531-74, at 4 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported 
mem. op.) (on file with authors) (discussing numerous issues including the 
meaning of “all revenues,” the interest charge for late distributions, and the 
agreements subject to distribution under Section 7(i)). The Aleut Corp. v. Arctic 
Slope Reg’l Corp. case led to five orders issued between 1976 and 1980, several of 
which were appealed to the Ninth Circuit: Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. 
(Aleut I), 410 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Alaska 1976); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l 
Corp. (Aleut II), 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom Aleut Corp. 
v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut III), 421 F. Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in 
part sub nom Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut IV), 424 F. Supp. 397 
(D. Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut V), 
484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980); see also Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 
569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 
(9th Cir. 1978). This article will not review the litigation history in detail. For a 
more detailed review, see Schutt, supra note 5, at 242–53. 
 7.  417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. Aleut III, 421 F. 
Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom Aleut IV, 424 F. Supp. 397 (D. 
Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980). 
 8.  The very first court decision on Section 7(i), Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, 
at 8, recognized that the congressional desire to minimize litigation and its costs 
“ha[d] not been altogether fulfilled.” See also Memorandum from Elizabeth 
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Sealaska Corporation, which was at the time the largest of the 7(i) payor 
regional corporations, due to its abundant timber resources, along with 
several other regional corporations, failing to distribute “potential § 7(i) 
revenues, citing the substantial uncertainties . . . in attempting to account 
for such revenues with the small amount of guidance presently 
available.”9 
Due to these costs and disagreements, by the late 1970s, the regional 
corporations began discussing a comprehensive settlement agreement 
regarding Section 7(i) obligations. After first meeting in 1977,10 several 
regional corporations began “a series of meetings concerning 7(i) . . .  to 
sit down and hammer out the principles of the 7(i) and to come up with a 
document” that the various regions could ratify.11 Several regional 
corporations met again in 1979 “to discuss and assess the 7(i) problem and 
to study the possibility of an out-of-court settlement of the issues.”12 An 
initial sharing agreement, entitled ‘A 7(i) Revenue Sharing Agreement,’ 
was drafted by Cook Inlet Region, Inc. and circulated among all the other 
corporations.13 
After years of intermittent meetings, Sealaska Corportation invited 
the other regional corporations to meet in Warm Springs, Oregon in 
1981.14 Sealaska observed that “[t]he stakes are very high,” but “the 
litigation ought to be resolved by the affected corporations rather than by 
the court, if at all possible.”15 All twelve regions participated and sent 
their presidents and attorney representatives.16 
 
 
 
Ingraham, Legal Counsel, Doyon, Ltd., to Tim Wallis, President, Doyon, Ltd. 1 
(June 8, 1981) (on file with authors) (“[T]o continue the litigation on deductions as 
well as other regions’ revenues would require a minimum of two years, at an 
average expenditure of $300,000 per year for outside attorneys’ fees and costs.”). 
 9.  Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., ANCSA 7(i) Historical Synopsis 6 (Aug. 
20, 1981) (on file with authors). 
 10.  In 1977, several regional corporations began a series of meetings to 
develop an agremeent that the various regions could ratify. Minutes of Board 
Meeting of February 14, Koniag, Inc. 15 (1978) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers, 
Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Library, Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) 
(on file with authors). 
 11.  Minutes of Koniag, Inc. Bd. of Dirs. 15 (Feb. 14, 1978) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen 
papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska 
Anchorage) (on file with authors). 
 12.  Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., supra note 9, at 5. 
 13.  Id. at 5. 
 14.  Id. at 6. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Interview with Margaret Brown, President and Chief Executive 
Officer (Retired), Cook Inlet Region, Inc., in Anchorage, Alaska (Apr. 26, 2016) (on 
file with authors). 
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In reviewing “the first ‘composite draft’ Section 7(i) settlement 
agreement” circulated in June 1981, Doyon’s legal counsel noted “three 
essential requirements to a satisfactory settlement.”17 First, the regional 
corporations were in agreement that the definitions of “revenues” should 
track, as closely as possible, court decisions that had construed the word 
to maximize sharing of resource revenues.18 Second, the regional 
corporations concurred that any agreed-upon deductions should be 
reasonable, and that the reporting requirements should be clear and 
further the aim of transparency in revenue sharing and costs.19 Third, the 
parties agreed that binding arbitration ought to be the exclusive means 
for Section 7(i) dispute resolution.20 
Following the Warm Springs meeting, the corporations held regular 
settlement conferences and drafting meetings.21 The Special Master later 
reported that “the many dozens of Corporation executives, attorneys, 
financial advisors and other experts attending each meeting openly 
debated each and every issue connected with 7(i).”22 The result was a draft  
settlement agreement that, in the Special Master’s words, was “something 
of a chimera: at several critical points it contained alternative approaches 
which affected the construction of the balance of the proposed 
agreement.”23 
Section 7(i)’s simple drafting as to revenues leaves many possible 
approaches to what types of costs a regional corporation might fairly 
incur and should be counted against revenues and recovered by that 
corporation because such a cost supports and advances the generation of 
revenue that is required to be shared under Section 7(i). For example, with 
regard to the deductions side of the equation, Doyon’s team noted that 
“[s]ince there [were] no rules to date on deductions, the whole deductions 
area [was] very cloudy.”24 The difference between the various regions’ 
approaches to these questions was dramatic.25 The Special Master and the 
 
 
 17.  Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, Legal Counsel, Doyon, Ltd. to 
Sam Kito, Dir., Doyon, Ltd. 1 (June 5, 1981) (on file with authors). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See Report of the Special Master Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, at 19 (Mar. 
28, 1983) [hereinafter Special Master Report] (on file with authors) (“The 
Agreement’s provisions for revenue accounting follow the expansive definition of 
§ 7(i) Revenue previously expressed by the Court.”). 
 22.  Id. at 12. 
 23.  Id. at 11. 
 24.  Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, supra note 8. 
 25.  See id. at 1–2 (discussing how “regions might well be allowed virtually 
all—or virtually none—of their claimed deductions,” depending on which 
categories are disallowed). 
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team from the twelve regions had the task of reconciling these differing 
viewpoints from the summer of 1981 until the summer of 1982. 
On June 29, 1982, the twelve regions reached a final settlement 
agreement, subject to the ratification by at least ten of the twelve 
corporations’ respective boards of directors.26 The document was 121 
pages long including two appendices. The Settlement Agreement: 
Represent[ed] an effort by the twelve Regional Corporations to 
resolve the cycle of litigation and to bring certainty to the 
application of § 7(i). In essence, the “Section 7(i) Settlement 
Agreement” represent[ed] an effort by the Regional 
Corporations to correct the deficiencies of ANCSA by a detailed 
agreement in order to render possible commercially viable 
resource development without litigation; it exhaustively defined  
terms and concepts, established detailed accounting procedures,  
and established a consensus among the Regions on policies for 
development of resources.27 
All twelve regional corporations ratified the Settlement 
Agreement.28 
A.  Amendments to the Agreement 
The regional corporation parties to the Settlement Agreement have 
amended the Agreement twice since 1982. In 1990, following several years 
of arbitration about the active harvest of Sealaska timber resources,29 the 
regions unanimously agreed to amend the Agreement. The amendment 
deleted Article II, section 9—a  provision addressing the harvest of timber 
 
 26.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 103 (showing the ten signatures 
of regional corporations on the Settlement Agreement); Memorandum from Jim 
Mery, Senior Counsel, Doyon, Ltd., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs. (Sept. 2, 1982) (on file 
with authors) (discussing how the agreement would be null and void without at 
least ten signatures). 
 27.  James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First 
Twenty Years, 38 ANNUAL ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 28 (1992); see also Special Master 
Report, supra note 21, at 1 (“[T]he Agreement substitutes a Uniform System of 
Accounting and Reporting for the present chaos of twelve Regional Corporations 
applying disparate, though equally defensible, accounting methods for 
determining net revenues available for distribution.”). 
 28.  See Doyon Bd. Resolution No. 82-53 (Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with authors); 
see also Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 5 (D. Alaska 
June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with authors). 
 29.  See Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp., AAA No. 75199002386 (Prelim. Op. of 
Arbitrators) (Aug. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Sealaska Arbitration Decision] 
(McGough, Arb.) (on file with authors); see also Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp., 
AAA No. 75199002386  (Decision and Award of Arbitrators) (Nov. 23, 1988) 
(McGough, Arb.) (on file with authors) (regarding the distribution and interest 
associated with timber resources under Section 7(i)). 
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for a corporation’s own account—from  the original Agreement and 
added a dozen new pages.30 This amendment, incorporated into Article 
III, section 3 of the Agreement, mostly defined allowable active 7(i) costs 
for timber.31 
The negotiations that led to this amendment began after the Sealaska 
Board of Directors, in 1989, “directed that Sealaska cease the active 
harvest of ANCSA timber until and unless an agreement can be reached 
among the Regional Corporations that allows a rational and prudent 
approach to timber valuation.”32 
By late March 1989, Sealaska and the eleven other regions entered a 
Memorandum of Understanding outlining a term sheet that would later 
form the basis of the 1990 amendments.33 At about the same time, the 
regions were considering another set of amendments to deal with the net 
operating loss (NOL) issues and the interactions with Section 7(i) then 
being debated between the regions and village corporations.34 Concurrent 
with the general NOL matter were related issues raised by the Mutual 
Assistance Agreement (MAA) among a majority of the regional 
corporations.35 The MAA helped Calista Corporation avoid a likely 
bankruptcy by backstopping a commercial loan with future Section 7(i) 
receipts and sales of Calista’s own NOL transactions, which gave Calista 
the financial flexibility to restructure its various business interests.36 
Despite these issues, the regional corporations did not adopt the proposed 
NOL amendments to the Agreement, in part because Congress amended 
Section 7(i) to explicitly exclude tax benefits from the definition of 
revenue, including revenue from NOL transactions.37 
 
 30.  See First Amendment to the 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 22, 1990) 
(amending Article III, § 3) (on file with authors). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Press Release, Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Corporation Will Not Appeal 7(i) 
Arbitration Ruling, at 2 (Feb. 9, 1989) (on file with authors). 
 33.  Letter from Byron Mallott, Chief Exec. Officer, Sealaska Corp., to Morris 
Thompson, President, Doyon, Ltd. (Mar. 30, 1989) (on file with authors). 
 34.  See Memorandum from Nathan Bergerbest, Gen. Counsel, Doyon, Ltd., 
William Timme, Middleton, Timme & McKay, Chris McNeil, Jr. Gen. Counsel, 
Sealaska Corp., and Mark Kroloff, Vice President and Gen. Counsel, CIRI, on 
Regional Corp. CEOs and Gen. Counsel (Dec. 11, 1990) (on file with authors). 
 35.  See Mutual Assistance Agreement between Ahtna, Inc., Arctic Slope Reg’l 
Corp., Bering Straits Native Corp., Chugach Alaska Corp., Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 
Doyon, Ltd., Koniag, Inc., Sealaska Corp. and Calista Corp., at 3 (Feb. 13, 1991) 
[hereinafter Mutual Assistance Agreement] (on file with authors) (agreeing to 
“assist Calista in obtaining financing from the Bank”). 
 36.  See id. at 3 (agreeing to “assist Calista in obtaining financing from the 
Bank”). 
 37.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-42, 109 Stat. 353, 
357 (1995) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ does not include 
any benefit received or realized for the uses of losses incurred or credits earned 
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In 2001, the regions, for the second time, unanimously agreed to 
amend Article II.38 This time, the regions rewrote section 2(b) of the 
Settlement Agreement, regarding resource contract scholarships for 
shareholders or members of their families.39 The amendment allowed 
regional corporations to exclude from their Gross Section 7(i) Revenue 
calculations up to $250,000 per year in scholarships paid directly by a 
third party as part of a contract or lease related to Section 7(i) Resources.40 
Alternatively, the amendment allowed the regional corporation to 
provide $250,000 in scholarships directly from revenue it received from a 
third party related to Section 7(i) Resources.41 
B.  Sectional Analysis of the Settlement Agreement 
Article I – Parties and Definitions 
 
Article I details the parties to the Settlement Agreement and defines 
a long set of terms. The parties were explicitly limited to ANCSA regional 
corporations, which own the valuable natural resources and are required 
to share revenues from those natural resources under Section 7(i), but are 
then obligated to share half of 7(i) payments received from other regional 
corporations to their respective at-large shareholders and village 
corporations under Section 7(j).42 Doyon’s counsel, Arthur Lazarus, 
recognized that the exclusion of village corporations as parties to the 
Settlement Agreement posed a risk because of the adversity of interests 
between the two groups. Lazarus wrote that “[s]ome features of the 
proposed Agreement will tend to reduce the size of the 70% resource 
revenue pool. . . . Obviously, these provisions may stimulate legal 
challenges to the Agreement.”43 Lazarus’s observation proved prescient,  
 
by a Regional Corporation.”). 
 38.  See Amendment No. 99-1 to Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 27, 
2001) (amending Article II, § 2) (on file with authors). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 1. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 1. The fact that village 
corporations were not included as parties was likely due to the combination of the 
adversity of interests on some important points and the impracticality of 
negotiating with roughly two hundred entities. But the lack of inclusion resulted 
in several disputes with village corporations post-Settlement Agreement. See infra 
notes 192–98 and accompanying text. 
 43.  Memorandum from Arthur Lazarus, Jr., P.C., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs. 8–9 
(July 9, 1982) [hereinafter Lazarus Memo] (on file with authors) (discussing 
proposed settlement of Section 7(i) litigation). 
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as several village corporations and at-large shareholders sued regional 
corporations in the 1990s, challenging several aspects of Section 7(i) and 
the Settlement Agreement.44 
The long list of defined terms includes the concepts of passive and 
active development of ANCSA Section 7(i) Resources, which were first 
articulated in the Doyon v. NANA decision in 1976.45 Passive development 
is essentially the approach of leasing resource-prospective lands to a third 
party company that explores, develops, and produces that resource and 
then pays lease rentals, royalties, or some other form of compensation to 
the regional corporation as compensation for the resource. By contrast, 
active development is the process where the regional corporation directly 
participates in those exploration, development, and production activities 
on its own or through some form of a joint venture. For the purposes of 
the Settlement Agreement, the difference between the two is when a 
resource-owning corporation “has made a Substantial Investment of Risk 
Capital,” which is defined as an investment greater than 10% of the fair 
market value of the investment into exploration or development of the 
ANCSA resource and at least $500,000.46 In Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp.47 
(the “Sealaska arbitration”), arbitrators described passive revenues as 
“generally those revenues derived from a contract to sell to a third party 
the right to develop, produce and sell resources which are in their natural 
state.”48 
The parties defined Section 7(i) Resources as follows: “The timber 
resources (other than timber acquired by merger with a Village 
Corporation) and resources from the subsurface estate in ANCSA Lands. 
Timber resources include both standing timber and future growth.”49 
Gross Section 7(i) resources are defined as: “all revenues (including 
 
 44.  See infra notes 199–212 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oliver v. Sealaska 
Corp., 192 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing the revenue sharing claims 
of ANCSA); Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving litigation over the revenue from net 
operating losses). 
 45.  See Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 9 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.) 
(on file with authors) (“A Regional Corporation can . . . take the role of an ‘active’ 
landowner and itself explore for, develop and produce the resource. . . . 
Alternatively, it may act as a ‘passive’ landowner and contract with another party 
which undertakes at its own expense all the necessary exploration, development 
and production of the resources.”). 
 46.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 3–5 (defining Gross Passive Section 
7(i) Revenues, Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues, and Substantial Investment of 
Risk Capital). 
 47.  AAA No. 75199002386 (Prelim. Op. of Arbitrators) (Aug. 11, 1988) 
[hereinafter Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op.] (McGough, Arb.) (on file with 
authors). 
 48.  Id. at 6. 
 49.  Id. at 2. 
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money, benefits and any other thing of value) received by a Corporation 
that are attributable to, directly related to, or generated from the 
exploration, development, production, lease, sale or other exploitation of, 
or the disposition of any interest in, the Corporation’s Section 7(i) 
Resources.”50 This definition is remarkably similar to, albeit slightly 
expanded, the Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.51 (Aleut V) court’s 
definition: “[R]evenues received by a regional corporation that are 
attributable to, directly related to, or generated by the acquisition of an 
interest in the corporation’s subsurface estate are revenues subject to the 
sharing provisions of section 7(i).”52 
Furthermore, the Agreement defines fair market value as “[t]he 
amount of money which an informed purchaser, willing but not obliged 
to buy, would pay an informed seller, willing but not obliged to sell, for 
particular property, goods or services. In determining the Fair Market 
Value of land, consideration shall be given to all uses to which the land is 
suited and might in reason be applied.”53 The concept of fair market value 
was a major issue in the Sealaska arbitration in the late 1980s.54 
Additionally, the Agreement defines a Section 7(i) Resource Contract 
as: 
Any contract or group of contracts for the exploration, 
development, production, lease, sale or other exploitation of, or 
the disposition of any interest in, a Corporation’s Section 7(i) 
Resources, including contracts permitting one or more of such 
activities, and also including contracts relating to Section 7(i) 
Resources to which a Corporation has succeeded pursuant to 
Section 14(g) of ANCSA.55 
This language closely tracks the early cases. In Aleut II, the court held 
that revenue received from contracts for exploration for subsurface 
resources were shareable.56 In Aleut V, the court held that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that revenues are shareable when “received 
 
 50.  Id. at 3. 
 51.  484 F. Supp. 482 (D. Alaska 1980). 
 52.  Id. at 485. 
 53.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 7. 
 54.  See Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 24–34; Schutt, supra 
note 5, at 261–62 (discussing the Sealaska timber arbitration). 
 55.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 9; see also ANCSA § 14(g), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1613(g) (providing that “[a]ll conveyances made [pursuant to ANCSA] . . . shall 
be subject to valid existing rights,” including prior federal leases, contracts, 
permits, rights-of-way and easements). 
 56.  Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. 900, 902–03 (D. Alaska 1976). 
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under an agreement, or a group of agreements that are regarded as one 
transaction, which has as its ultimate object the acquisition of an interest 
in the subsurface estate . . . .”57 
Article II – Revenues 
 
Article II of the Settlement Agreement addresses revenues. Overall, 
the Agreement attempts to broadly construe revenues and subject as 
much as possible to Section 7(i).58 In addition, Article II addresses and 
incorporates many of the holdings of the early court decisions into its 
framework for Section 7(i) Revenues. 
For example, section 1(b) provides that “if Section 7(i) Revenues are 
received in a form other than cash or cash equivalents, the Fair Market 
Value at the time of receipt shall be included in Gross Section 7(i) 
Revenues.”59 This closely matches the holding in Aleut II, which measured 
non-cash receipts as the greater of: 
(a) the fair market value of the non-monetary benefit received; 
(b) the cost or detriment to the entity furnishing the non-
monetary benefit; or 
(c) the difference between the royalty or other cash 
consideration actually received and that which would have 
been received but for the furnishing of the non-monetary 
benefit.60 
The Aleut II court further stated that “non-monetary and indirect 
benefits should be discouraged in the context of section 7(i) because of the 
problems that they invite.”61 
The Agreement also makes clear that revenues received prior to 
patent or interim conveyance are revenues subject to distribution.62 This 
tracks the holding in the Aleut I decision.63 
Subsection 1(d) addresses borrowing. It provides that loans secured 
by Section 7(i) Resources, or their proceeds, are not Section 7(i) Revenues 
“to the extent that the proceeds of such borrowing or sale are used . . . to 
finance or refinance Development, Production or Post-Production Costs 
 
 57.  Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Alaska 1980). 
 58.  See Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 19 (“The Agreement’s 
provisions for revenue accounting follow the expansive definition of § 7(i) 
Revenue previously expressed by the Court.”). 
 59.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15. 
 60.  Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. at 904. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15. 
 63.  Aleut I, 410 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Alaska 1976). 
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in connection with the exploitation of Section 7(i) Resources . . . .”64 
However, to the extent that a corporation secures borrowing with Section 
7(i) Resources that are “greater than the Corporation’s Distributable Share 
of Net Section 7(i) Revenues,” then there is a “recognition of Gross Section 
7(i) Revenues.”65 This was not a popular provision among the regional 
corporations, who recognized that treating borrowing this way would 
hinder their ability to raise capital for projects unrelated to Section 7(i) 
Resource development.66 Nevertheless, the Special Master insisted upon 
its inclusion.67 
In 1988, Chugach Alaska Corporation secured $13 million of debt to 
The Travelers Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity 
Company with “all of the standing and downed timber located on certain 
land conveyed to [Chugach]” and rights necessary to harvest the timber 
including rock, sand, and gravel.68 Chugach did not disclose the loans or 
security interests in its annual Section 7(i) reports to the other regional 
corporations for 1988, 1989, or 1990.69 When Chugach filed for bankruptcy 
in 1991,70 each of the other regional corporations became creditors in part 
because of Article II, section 1(d).71 Chugach and the eleven other regional 
corporations entered a settlement agreement in June 1992 to resolve these 
issues.72 This episode with Chugach demonstrates the value to the other 
regional corporations of assuring that borrowings against Section 7(i) 
Resources can serve as a mechanism that is economically equivalent to 
revenue and should therefore be shared at the time of the loan. 
Section 3 addresses the allocation of revenue between the surface 
and subsurface estates—the same issue addressed in Aleut V. It excludes 
from Gross Section 7(i) Revenues any compensation received by a 
regional corporation for surface rights only to the extent permitted by the 
Settlement Agreement.73 There is an inherent tension in allocating 
 
 64.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 15. 
 65.  Id. at 18–19. 
 66.  Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Chugach Settlement Agreement between Chugach Alaska Corp. and 
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Ahtna, Inc., The Aleut Corp., Bering Straits Native Corp., 
Bristol Bay Native Corp., Calista Corp., Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Doyon, Ltd., 
Koniag, Inc., NANA Reg’l Corp., and Sealaska Corp., at 1–2 (June 17, 1992) 
[hereinafter Chugach Settlement Agreement] (on file with authors). 
 69.  Id. at 3. 
 70.  See In re Chugach Alaska Corp., 147 B.R. 214, No. A91-00207-3-DMD, at 214 
(AK LBR 1991) (discussing Chugach Alaska Corporation’s objection to IRS 
claims). 
 71.  Chugach Settlement Agreement, supra note 68, at 1. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 27; see also Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 
482, 485 (D. Alaska 1980). 
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revenues as between the surface and subsurface when a regional 
corporation owns both because revenues attributable to the surface are 
not shareable. But on the other hand, accessing the subsurface to develop 
and produce valuable resources often requires the construction of 
facilities at the surface that burden the surface estate and should therefore 
be a compensable event. These tensions therefore require a balance of 
these competing realities. Section 3 attempts this balance by capping the 
allocation to surface estate at the lesser of fair market value for the surface 
rights or the valuation provided in the agreements at issue.74 In both the 
Agreement and the Aleut V decision, the burden of proof regarding the 
valuation is upon the land-owning regional corporation.75 
Section 6 addresses land exchanges. The regional corporations knew 
that land exchanges involving ANCSA lands were possible, if not 
inevitable, as the land ownership patterns among the three main 
landowners in Alaska—the federal government, the state government, 
and the ANCSA regional corporations—were implemented at the 
detailed, local level from the broad legislative framework of ANCSA. 
ANCSA’s land selection pattern combined with existing and desired 
federal conservation units, in particular, made for certain awkward land 
ownership. An example was the Cook Inlet Land Exchange, which 
Congress authorized in 1976.76 The Agreement’s structure tracks the logic 
of revenue derived from ANCSA interests: where a corporation 
exchanges subsurface interest, alone or in combination with any other 
interest, for some other interest, revenue derived from the new interest is 
shareable up to the fair market value of the subsurface interest.77 In 
contrast, trading a surface estate interest for another interest does not 
create a sharing obligation under the Agreement from the new interest 
because revenue derived from the surface interest, excepting timber, 
would not have been shareable.78 
 
 74.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 27. 
 75.  Id.; Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. at 485. In Aleut V, the court’s language 
establishing the rebuttable presumption is limited to the subsurface estate, but the 
Special Master Report two years later expanded this concept to timber resources 
as well. See id. at 485–87; Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 20 (“[T]he 
Agreement adopts a rebuttable presumption that any revenues connected with 
any disposition of subsurface or timber resources are shareable.”). 
 76.  See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1145 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.); 
Act of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-456, 90 Stat. 1934 (identifying Terms and 
Conditions for Land Consolidation and Management in the Cook Inlet Area). See 
generally Cook Inlet Land Exchange, 30-YEAR ANNIVERSARY NEWSLETTER (Oct. 2006) 
(on file with authors). 
 77.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 25–27. 
 78.  See id. at 32; Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, at 8 (D. Alaska 
Sept. 24, 1997) (unreported order on motion to dismiss) (“Article II, subsection 
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Section 6 was tested just a year after the Settlement Agreement 
became effective. “[Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC)] openly 
and candidly admitted that they structured the trade for the Kaktovik 
subsurface so as to qualify that trade under section 6(g). ASRC was not 
deceitful, was not acting in bad faith, and was not unfair in structuring a 
trade that was specifically invited by language” in the Settlement 
Agreement.79 But other regional corporations were concerned that the 
exchange of certain ASRC surface lands within a federal conservation unit 
for potentially extremely valuable subsurface estate should have made 
the received subsurface land subject to 7(i) sharing like other ANCSA 
subsurface lands. 
Section 7 addresses sand and gravel resources. The regional 
corporations had litigated the topic of sand and gravel from the time of 
ANCSA’s passage in 1971 until the Settlement Agreement in 1982.80  This 
was one area where the regional corporations limited the impact of prior 
court rulings. In the original Agreement, the regional corporations 
recognized that Ninth Circuit decisions ruling that sand and gravel were 
Section 7(i) Resources had imposed tremendous difficulty in bookkeeping 
for the many small transactions involving sand and gravel.81 The 
Settlement Agreement therefore excluded from Gross Section 7(i) 
Revenues the first $100,000 of gross revenues derived from sales of “sand, 
stone, gravel, pumicite or cinder resources” each fiscal year.82 The section 
also provides that if Congress amended ANCSA to exclude sand and 
 
 
 
 
 
6(g) of the Settlement Agreement is the converse of ANCSA subsection 7(i) in that 
it is designed to provide that revenues received from the disposition of surface 
estate (other than timber) are not subject to sharing.”) (on file with authors). 
 79.  Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., AAA No. 75113030986, at 18 (Mar. 
28, 1989) [hereinafter ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op.] (Morris, Arb.) (on file with 
authors). 
 80.  See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 725 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 
1984); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1978), 
rev’g Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. 862, 864 (D. Alaska 1976); see also Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor 
Forest Res., 39 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing rock resources rather than sand 
or gravel). 
 81.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35 (referring to Chugach Natives, 
Inc., 588 F.2d at 732). 
 82.  Id. At least one village corporation opposed this provision because “the 
villages are giving up their right to a portion of the § 7(i) sharing revenues, but do 
not gain any guarantee of sand and gravel ownership in return.” Ukpeagvik 
Inupiat Corp., Position Paper (Mar. 9, 1983) (on file with Arnold “Ole” Olsen 
papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Library, Univ. of Alaska 
Anchorage). 
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gravel from the requirements of Section 7(i), they would no longer be 
considered Section 7(i) Resources under the Settlement Agreement.83 The 
1998 amendments to ANCSA did in fact exclude such resources.84 
Section 8 addresses mergers of a regional corporation and any other 
corporation.85 The section makes clear that following such a merger, 
Section 7(i) Resources and Revenues remain subject to sharing under the 
Agreement.86 The section also states that the merger or consolidation 
transaction itself does not trigger a Section 7(i) Revenue recognition 
event.87 This was an important consideration given that NANA and 
Ahtna had merged with the majority of the village corporations in each 
of their respective regions.88  As such, the question of the impact of Section 
7(i) with regard to the then recently completed mergers was a non-issue. 
Article III – Deductions 
 
Article III addresses deductions. Unlike revenues, deductions 
received almost no attention in the litigation during the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the issue was squarely on the minds of Settlement 
Agreement negotiators. In a memorandum summarizing the draft 
Settlement Agreement, Doyon’s attorney noted: “[B]y the end of 1980, the 
litigation promised to become even more burdensome as the focus of the 
court proceedings moved from gross revenues to the complex and 
extremely difficult question of allowable deductions.”89 
The Special Master’s report made several important observations 
regarding the Settlement Agreement’s allowance for deductions. First, it 
noted that the “deduction rules operate in three dimensions: what 
categories of costs may be deducted; when costs should be recognized; 
and what constitute allowable costs within the categories.”90 The Special 
 
 
 83.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35. 
 84.  See ANCSA Land Bank Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-333, § 8, 
112 Stat. 3129, 3134 (codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)). 
 85.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 36. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See id. 
 88.  Ownership of Lands, NANA REG’L CORP, INC., 
http://www.nana.com/regional/ lands/subsistence/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) 
(“In 1976, a merger of the area’s regional corporation and ten of the eleven village 
corporations resulted in NANA’s ownership of both the surface and subsurface 
acreage, with the exception of the surface acreage Kikiktagruk Iñupiat 
Corporation (KIC) retained.”); LYDIA L. HAYS, ALASKA NATIVE TRIBES, ANCSA 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS, Appendix C (2015) (listing the Ahtna, 
Inc. merger with eight of its nine village corporations in 1980 and the NANA 
merger in 1976). 
 89.  Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 2. 
 90.  Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 25. 
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Master’s report added that the “Agreement introduces three principal 
standards for determining the deductibility of an item of cost: 
reasonableness, allocability and substantiation.”91 
The allowance for deductions became a controversial issue among 
the regional corporations. Doyon’s outside counsel noted, “[a]mong the 
most controversial issues in the litigation thus was whether general and 
administrative costs (G&A) were allowable deductions and, if so, to what 
extent. Indeed, Doyon’s own position on this question changed twice.”92 
The courts also struggled with this topic, in part because Congress 
provided no guidance in the language or legislative history of ANCSA.93 
In the first court case between regional corporations regarding Section 
7(i), the court proposed “a strictly limited net concept allowing only 
deductions which are directly related to the production of [Section 7(i)] 
revenues” and expressly disallowed “land selection expenses, salaries of 
regular corporate employees, or overhead or administrative expenses.”94 
The Settlement Agreement again broke from court precedent and 
charted a different path on G&A costs that relies on a formula rather than 
an allocation of actual overhead. The Agreement set a standard 
deduction, “not subject to audit or change,” at $300,000 per fiscal year.95 
In addition, in a single fiscal year, a corporation is permitted to deduct a 
percentage of its adjusted Gross Section 7(i) Revenues based on a sliding 
scale: 20% on up to $3 million, 6% on up to $100 million, and 4% on 
amounts greater than $100 million.96 
The Settlement Agreement also specifies costs that could be included 
as itemized deductions. The Agreement categorizes a number of costs as 
allowable: “Passive Section 7(i) Costs,” including land selection costs 
regional corporations incurred in selecting ANCSA lands for resource 
potential; pre-conveyance geological and geophysical costs; costs 
incurred in negotiating contracts related to Section 7(i) Resources; 
contract administration costs; litigation costs related to Section 7(i) 
Resources; resource management costs; Section 7(i) Resource taxes; and 
costs of acquiring an interest in ANCSA lands, and borrowing costs.97 
 
 91.  Id. at 29. 
 92.  Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 4. 
 93.  See Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. 862, 868 (D. Alaska 1976) (noting that while 
House bill “spoke only in terms of ‘revenues’,” the Senate bill also referred to “net 
revenues.”). 
 94.  Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 11 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.) 
(on file with authors). 
 95.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 38. 
 96.  See id. at 60–61. Unlike tax brackets for federal income taxes, the scale is 
not progressive, but brackets the floor and ceiling based on the fiscal year revenue 
for each category. See id. 
 97.  See id. at 39–42. 
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Additionally, section 5 of Article III requires the corporations to keep 
detailed records of allowable Section 7(i) costs.98 For example, in the 
ASRC arbitration, the panel rejected ASRC’s cost allocations because 
“ASRC made no attempt to keep . . . [t]he requisite contemporaneous 
records and detail so as to be able to allocate in accordance with Article 
III, Section 5 . . . .”99 Section 5 details the types of allowable costs per 
category and the methods of recordkeeping for labor, in-house costs like 
travel, outside vendor costs, and dedicated facilities and equipment.100 
Subsection (b) provides an allocation methodology for labor and 
equipment used for Section 7(i) activities and non-Section 7(i) activities.101 
Article IV – Calculation of Distributable Revenues 
 
Article IV is a short but complicated article addressing the 
“calculation of distributable revenues.”102 This distributable revenues 
concept addresses situations where a regional corporation has both active 
and passive 7(i) activities and revenues by allowing a balance of 
recovering certain active development costs by off-setting them against 
passive revenues within the same period. But it caps that active-to-
passive transition such that the regional corporation cannot eliminate 
sharing of its passive revenues alogether. Section 1 begins by requiring 
each regional corporation, for each fiscal year, to first calculate its 
Adjusted Gross Passive Section 7(i) Revenues.103 Then, 
[i]f that calculation yields a positive number, sixty percent (60%) 
of the Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Passive Section 7(i) 
revenues shall be segregated and shall be added to the 
Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues, if 
any, in computing the Corporation’s Adjusted Gross Section 7(i) 
Revenues for the year; the other forty percent (40%) shall be 
added to the Corporation’s Gross Active Section 7(i) Revenues 
for that year.104 
The Special Master’s Report to the Aleut court recites the history of 
the sixty-forty split. The split was a solution to the debate among the 
regional corporations over whether Section 7(i) “established a collective 
70% interest in the revenues from individual transactions or parcels of 
property” or “realized net revenues, if any, from [a regional 
 
 98.  Id. at 55. 
 99.  ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 18–19. 
 100.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 56–57. 
 101.  Id. at 57–58. 
 102.  Id. at 62–64. 
 103.  Id. at 62. 
 104.  Id. 
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corporation’s] timber and subsurface estate taken as a whole.”105 The 
Special Master noted that the sixty-forty split “allow[ed] developer 
Regional Corporations the opportunity to recover its reasonable costs 
from its other [Section 7(i)] Revenues and thus spend with some 
confidence the capital needed to earn revenues, while to some extent 
protecting other Regional Corporations from the undue diversion of 
annual distributions.”106 
Article V – Compliance Mechanism 
 
Section 1 requires each regional corporation to distribute to the other 
eleven corporations “their Distributive shares of the Corporation’s Net 
Section 7(i) Revenues” for the prior fiscal year within ninety days of the 
close of the fiscal year.107 This was an important inclusion in the 
Settlement Agreement as Section 7(i) itself is silent as to the timeframe for 
required sharing of Section 7(i) revenues.108 This is another example of the 
Settlement Agreement negotiators deciding to make explicit prior court 
holdings, particularly the ninety-day timeframe established by the 
earliest court decision on Section 7(i) in Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Regional 
Corp.109 
If a corporation fails to make appropriate and timely distribution of 
the required sums, the Agreement provides for the payment of interest 
“at the Prime Rate plus five percent (5%) per year on all amounts not 
distributed or escrowed.”110 In 2002, Sealaska exercised this provision 
when it “deferred the Company’s own fiscal year 2001 Section 7(i) and 7(j) 
distributions, due March 30, 2002, until the summer of 2002.”111 
Additionally, section 3 sets out the reporting requirements. It 
requires that the corporation issue a Section 7(i) annual report to the other 
corporations within 180 days of the close of the company’s fiscal year.112 
Moreover, subsection 3(d) requires the Section 7(i) annual report to 
provide an “itemization of the Corporation’s Section 7(i) Costs by 
category of allowable costs as maintained by the Corporation in its books 
and records.”113 The Sealaska arbitration panel noted: “[W]e believe that 
 
 105.  Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 17–18. 
 106.  Id. at 19. 
 107.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65. 
 108.  See ANCSA § 7(i). 
 109.  Doyon v. NANA, No. 1531-74, at 14 (D.D.C. 1974) (unreported mem. op.) 
(on file with authors). 
 110.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65. 
 111.  SEALASKA CORP., 2001 Annual Report to Shareholders, 19 (on file with 
authors). 
 112.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 65. 
 113.  Id. at 69. 
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the drafters of the agreement intended to make substantial compliance 
with the record-keeping requirements a condition precedent to the 
allowance of a deduction for costs which are to be described in the 
records.”114 
Furthermore, section 8 provides that any regional corporation may 
“commence an audit or other examination” of the financial and 
contractual records of a reporting corporation within twelve months of 
the transmittal of a Section 7(i) annual report.115 In the event that a 
corporation institutes an audit, it must give a sixty-day notice to every 
other corporation, including the corporation to be audited.116 Each 
regional corporation has the right to join the audit and to expand the list 
of audited items.117 Thereafter, to prevent the disruption of business and 
duplication of efforts, no other corporation is permitted to audit or 
examine the same report.118 If the results of the audit show that the 
reporting regional corporation understated Net Section 7(i) Revenues by 
5% or more, but not less than $100,000, then the audited regional 
corporation must pay the costs of the audit.119 Otherwise, the audit costs 
are the responsibility of the regional corporation or corporations that 
requested the audit.120 
Section 9 addresses the consequences of a corporation’s failure to 
transmit its Section 7(i) annual report. In such circumstances, any other 
corporation may give sixty days written notice and then commence an 
“audit or other examination of the pertinent financial and contractual 
records of the non-reporting Corporation.”121 In essence, a regional 
corporation can perform the financial reporting and issue a Section 7(i) 
annual report for a non-reporting region, and this audit becomes binding 
on the non-reporting region unless challenged in arbitration within 120 
days of issuance of the report.122 While this provision has never been 
exercised, it highlights the importance of the Section 7(i) annual report to 
the other regional corporations as stakeholders in Section 7(i) Resources 
outside their own regions. 
Additionally, section 10 provides that a regional corporation may 
escrow revenues if it is “uncertain how to treat revenues received or 
expenses incurred . . . and avoid the interest and penalty provisions of 
 
 114.  Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 37. 
 115.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 72. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 73. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 73–74. 
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Section 2” of Article V while it initiates an arbitration to seek resolution 
of the issues.123 This provision may provide an option for corporations as 
they wrestle with matters unforeseen at the time of the Settlement 
Agreement like carbon credits, conservation easements, and other matters 
not clearly addressed by the Agreement.124 
Article VI – Arbitration 
 
Article VI makes arbitration the exclusive method for Settlement 
Agreement dispute resolution, with exceptions for disputes involving 
“Federal or State income tax consequences of revenues, deductions, 
distributions, or any other income tax issues.”125 The Special Master 
explained: “The Agreement does not purport to resolve the Federal or 
state income tax consequences of [Section 7(i)] revenues, deductions, 
distributions or other issues. Indeed, the Agreement . . . expressly 
excludes such issues from arbitration.”126 
The topic of depletion was a significant hang-up among the regional 
corporations when negotiating the Settlement Agreement. In a letter to 
the Special Master, ten regional corporations recounted: “[A] clear 
majority of the corporations were in agreement that the Section 7(i) 
Agreement was not intended to resolve the issues of depletion. It was 
recognized that it was impossible to get agreement on this issue and some 
corporations expressed the view that it was a tax matter and not a matter 
for [the Agreement].”127 
In reviewing the final draft of the Settlement Agreement, Doyon’s 
outside counsel noted the purpose of the arbitration provisions: 
The object of the Agreement is to avoid further litigation over 
Section 7(i) issues, and all of Article V is devoted to procedures 
for implementing the settlement . . . . Article VI of the Agreement 
further provides that . . . all issues arising under Section 7(i) or 
the Agreement shall be subject exclusively to arbitration.128 
An earlier draft of the Settlement Agreement did not include binding 
arbitration provisions and required three corporations to join the request 
for arbitration, which caused Doyon’s legal counsel to remark: 
 
 123.  Id. at 74. 
 124.  See Schutt, supra note 5, at 268–70. 
 125.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 77–83. 
 126.  Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 26. 
 127.  Letter from Chugach Natives, Inc. and Bristol Bay Native Corp. to Ralph 
Wienshienk, Special Master (Nov. 12, 1982) (on file with authors). 
 128.  Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5. 
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Doyon may as well get an outside law firm and put it 
permanently on retainer to do nothing but handle appeals from 
Section 7(i) arbitrations, because it is virtually guaranteed that 
we will have an even higher level of litigation, and more 
attorneys’ fees, than we have at the present time.129 
In the 1980s, several regions filed arbitration cases that resulted in 
final decisions regarding the applicability of Section 7(i) to land 
exchanged between ASRC and the federal government and to Sealaska 
timber.130 Following the arbitration, Sealaska filed suit in federal district 
court attempting to overturn the arbitrators’ decision.131 In rejecting 
Sealaska’s challenge, the court noted: “The corporations intended the 
Agreement to be a definitive declaration of their revenue sharing 
obligations under section 7(i), and to provide an alternative mechanism 
for resolving any controversies that might arise in the future regarding 
those obligations.”132 The court rejected Sealaska’s arguments for 
escaping the binding nature of the arbitration clause in the Agreement, 
stating: “When parties agree to commit a particular question to binding 
arbitration before a specialized tribunal, a federal district court may not 
disturb their decision, absent special circumstances . . . .”133 
In the ASRC arbitration proceeding regarding the Kaktovik Land 
Exchange, ASRC made a legal argument that “the Claimants have waived 
their rights to arbitrate the issues raised in these proceedings by reason of 
the fact that they have participated in the formulation of pending 
legislation before the Congress of the United States.”134 The arbitrators 
ruled against ASRC on this point.135 
The Settlement Agreement adopts the ‘loser-pays’ rule otherwise 
applicable in civil litigation in Alaska’s state courts under Rule 82 of 
Alaska’s Rules of Civil Procedure.136 The Agreement defines the 
“prevailing party” as the defendant regional corporation “if the outcome 
 
 129.  Memorandum from Elizabeth Ingraham, supra note 17. 
 130.  See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., AAA No. 75113030986 
(Aug. 14, 1989) [hereinafter ASRC Arbitration Decision] (Morris, Arb.) (on file 
with authors); Sealaska Arbitration Decision, supra note 29; see also Schutt, supra 
note 5, at 242–46 (discussing arbitration cases). 
 131.  See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut VI), Civ. No. A88-515 
(Jan. 24, 1989) (on file with authors). The court merged the case with the original 
Aleut v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. case, Civ. No. A75-053. 
 132.  Id. at 5. 
 133.  Id. at 9–10; see also id. at 17 (“Sealaska’s decision to sign the Agreement 
and save itself the costs of perpetual litigation was an informed and intelligent 
waiver of its right to argue in this forum . . . .”). 
 134.  ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 19. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 82. 
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of the arbitration and any appeal does not increase its Net Section 7(i) 
Revenues before any carry-forward of deductions by five percent (5%) or 
more, but not less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).”137 
In the Sealaska arbitration, the arbitrators awarded the claimant 
regional corporations $1.0 million in attorneys’ fees.138 In the ASRC 
arbitration, the arbitrators found ASRC to be the prevailing party and 
awarded it 75% of its actual fees, or $1.2 million, as a “reasonable and 
appropriate sum . . . in a very complex case.”139 
Per section 15, post-arbitration proceedings are governed by chapter 
09.43 of the Alaska Statutes.140 However, the Superior Court for the Third 
Judicial District in Anchorage is the exclusive venue for such 
proceedings.141 Sealaska challenged the applicability of this section as a 
part of the Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. (Aleut VI)142 case, 
arguing that did not prevent it from removing the post-arbitration 
proceeding from state court to federal court.143  The federal district court 
held that the “forum selection clause at issue is exclusive and 
mandatory,” before remanding the arbitration enforcement action to state 
court.144 
Article VII – Settlement Provisions Relating to Past Transactions 
 
Although lacking relevance to current Section 7(i) controversies, 
Article VII was critically important at the time of negotiations due to the 
long time period covered by the Settlement Agreement (1972 to 1982), the 
multiple court cases involved, and the interaction with prior settlement 
agreements among less than the full twelve regions.145 Article VII begins 
by setting March 31, 1982, as the cut-off date. That is, the Settlement 
Agreement governs all determinations of revenues and costs on and after 
April 1, 1982.146 
Sections 2 and 3 set out the agreed upon past Section 7(i) revenues 
earned and costs expensed by each regional corporation, with the 
exception of ASRC. In Doyon’s case, the negotiated amounts were 
significant: 
 
 137.  Id. at 90. 
 138.  Sealaska Arbitration Decision, supra note 29, at 10. 
 139.  ASRC Arbitration Decision, supra note 130, at 6. 
 140.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 83. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515 (on file with authors). 
 143. Id. at 18–19. 
 144.  Id. at 19, 21. 
 145.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 91–100. 
 146.  See id. at 91. 
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Doyon was able to increase the amount of its claimed past 
deductions from about $2.5 million to $5,922,911—primarily by 
applying to direct Section 7(i) expenses an allocation of G&A 
costs which had not been used before. More importantly, the 
Doyon representatives were able to convince a majority of the 
other Regional Corporations that, because of its substantial 
earlier investments, Doyon’s active development revenues 
(through its subsidiary, Tanana Asbestos Corp.) from the Doyon 
asbestos project should be excluded from shareable Section 7(i) 
revenues and that only Doyon’s income under the primary lease 
(passive development) need be shared under ANCSA.147 
Section 4 summarizes what each regional corporation owed based 
upon the difference between the amounts in sections 2 and 3, less prior 
distributions made. Sections 5 and 6 set out the deduction carry-forwards 
and prior excess distributions for each regional corporation. 
Section 7 structures the payment of Section 7(i) revenues from the 
settlement period (1972 to 1981) for ASRC in recognition of the magnitude 
of certain revenues in question at the time of settlement.148 ASRC agreed 
to pay $7,250,000 in installments, with $1,500,000 payable within thirty 
days of the dismissal of the Aleut case, and the balance in not more than 
ten annual payments.149 
Section 11 requires each party to dismiss all claims from Aleut with 
prejudice, and blocks the Settlement Agreement from going into effect 
until they had done so.150 The district court issued an order dismissing the 
case with prejudice on June 3, 1983.151 
Article VIII – Miscellaneous 
 
Article VIII includes miscellaneous provisions. 152 Section 1 
recognizes that the Agreement was a compromise of “current disputes 
and disagreements over the interpretation and application of Section 7(i) 
of ANCSA” and specifically the Aleut case.153 Just as importantly, the 
provision recognizes that the Agreement governs the “future relationship 
of the parties towards one another in complying with Section 7(i)” and 
acknowledged that the parties had “foregone legitimate [legal] positions” 
 
 147.  Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 6–7. 
 148.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 87–90. 
 149.  See id. at 87–88. 
 150.  Id. at 91. 
 151.  See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 6 (D. 
Alaska June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with 
authors). 
 152.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 93–100. 
 153.  Id. at 100. 
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in order to reach agreement.154 In his report to the Aleut court, the Special 
Master summarized the history and importance of the provision: “As 
with any achievable compromise, few of the Agreement’s provisions 
satisfied all parties. However, the consensual nature of a unanimous 
Agreement reached after extensive arm’s length bargaining demonstrates 
the fairness and feasibility of the whole.”155 The arbitrators in the ASRC 
case noted one example: 
ASRC initially deducted the cost of lobbying for passage of 
ANILCA against Section 7(i) revenues. These deductions were 
challenged in the Section 7(i) federal court litigation and were 
ultimately compromised in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 
Settlement Agreement.156 
Section 2 provides that the Agreement was an integrated agreement 
that “express[es] the entire agreement and understanding of the 
parties.”157 In this case, the clause was particularly important, as ASRC 
had finalized several settlement agreements with other individual 
regional corporations that were superseded by the Agreement.158 
Section 3 is a severability provision. It provides that Articles II, III 
and IV “are the essence of th[e] Agreement,” excepting sections 7 (sand 
and gravel) and 8 (mergers of corporations) of Article II.159 It further 
recognizes the grand compromises  inherent in the settlement agreement 
and the fact that many of the provisions are interdependent.160 Section 3 
provides that if a court materially changes the financial aspects of the 
Agreement by determining that any of the referenced provisions are 
“incompatible with ANCSA,” then “the entire Agreement shall be 
rendered prospectively void and unenforceable and that they will 
promptly attempt in good faith to negotiate a new Agreement.”161 
Section 7 is an extensive provision regarding indemnification.162 This 
section creates indemnity between regional corporations in the event of a 
successful suit brought by a village corporation, or at-large shareholder, 
 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Special Master Report, supra note 21, at 13. 
 156.  ASRC Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 79, at 9. 
 157.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 93. 
 158.  See id. at 98 (“Arctic Slope has previously entered into settlement 
agreements with Ahtna, Inc., Bering Straits Native Corporation, Calista 
Corporation, NANA Regional Corporation, Inc., Chugach Natives, Inc., and 
Bristol Bay Native Corporation.”); see also Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., supra 
note 9. 
 159.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 94. 
 160.  See id. 
 161.  Id. at 101–02. 
 162.  See id. at 103–07. 
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against either a recipient corporation or a distributing corporation.163 This 
provision reflects the regional corporations’ understanding of the risk 
attending to the village corporations’ non-party status and the then 
legally untested interactions between Sections 7(i), 7(j), and the Settlement 
Agreement.164 
Subsection (g) concludes by providing that the Settlement 
Agreement does not create a cause of action for village corporations or 
regional corporation shareholders.165 Several lawsuits by village 
corporations and at-large shareholders in the 1990s challenged this legal 
conclusion, but the regional corporations ultimately prevailed in the 
litigation.166 
Article IX – Ratification of Agreement 
 
Article IX requires that at least ten of the twelve regional 
corporations ratify the Agreement for it to become effective and binding 
on all corporations that had ratified it.167 It also provides for the method 
of ratification, the effective date, and the deadline for ratification of 
October 1, 1982.168 An arbitration panel “interpret[ed] the effective date . 
. . as the date on which a resolution of notification of the tenth corporation 
was served, or 1982, even though court approval was not given until June 
of 1983.”169 Each of the twelve regional corporations ratified the 
Agreement by the October 1, 1982 deadline.170 
Section 1 requires that each corporation cooperate in the defense of 
the Agreement in “any legal action by anyone not a party to this 
Agreement.”171 The parties included this provision because village 
corporations were not parties to the Settlement Agreement and the 
regional corporations knew there was some risk of a Section 7(j) 
 
 163.  Id. at 103–06. 
 164.  See Schutt, supra note 5, at 258–59 (describing legal challenges to the  
Settlement Agreement brought by village corporations); Lazarus Memo, supra 
note 43, at 8–9 (anticipating risk of village corporations “challenging the 
Agreement or any distributions made pursuant thereto”). 
 165.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 107. 
 166.  See Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1999); Bay View, Inc. 
ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997); Dagg 
v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A94-044, slip op. at 1–2 (D. Alaska May 2, 
1994) (on file with authors). This article discusses each of these cases in more 
detail, see infra Part III. 
 167.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 98. 
 168.  See id. at 101. 
 169.  Sealaska Arbitration Prelim. Op., supra note 47, at 38. 
 170.  See Resolution of Doyon Bd., No. 82-53 (Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with 
authors); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 5 (D. Alaska 
June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with authors). 
 171.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 100. 
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“attack”on the Agreement, challenging whether they should have been 
parties and signatories because of their inherent economic interest in 7(i) 
sharing among the regional corporations.172 
Article X – Amendments 
 
The regional corporations intentionally made the amendment 
process for the Settlement Agreement very difficult. Article X requires 
consensus among all twelve regional corporations for the enactment of an 
amendment.173 Despite the difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement 
among the regional corporations, there have been two amendments: (1) a 
major revision in 1990 changing the methodology for calculating revenue 
under Section 7(i) for timber resources,174 and (2) an amendment 
addressing scholarships for shareholders from resource revenue.175 
Article XI – Review 
 
Article XI provides that the corporations shall meet approximately 
every two years “for the purpose of reviewing how the Agreement is 
operating and whether any modifications seem desirable.”176  Despite the 
presence of this Article, the regional corporations have not met in many 
years to discuss the Agreement or modification of it. 
Appendix A 
 
Appendix A provides accounting procedures for operating 
equipment and facilities.177 It “provides guidance for compliance with the 
cost allocation provisions of Article III Section 5.”178 The appendix has 
four parts: Scope and Applicability, Definitions and General Principles, 
Basic Considerations, and Special Considerations.179 
 
 
 
 
 172.  See Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 9 (explaining the legal cooperation 
provision to Doyon Board of Directors). 
 173.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 102. 
 174.  See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 175.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. 
 176.  See Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
 177.  Id. at 104. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 104–11. 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B addresses two region-specific issues.180 First, it 
addresses a resource-specific issue in the Doyon region involving an 
asbestos deposit.181 The appendix provided that Doyon: 
Shall be deemed to receive Gross Passive Section 7(i) Revenues 
and incur Passive Section 7(i) Costs as Lessor under its lease for 
asbestos development in the area of Eagle, Alaska, with GCO 
Minerals Co., Tanana Asbestos Corp., and Boreal Exploration 
Co., Lessees, and shall not be deemed to receive Gross Active 
Section 7(i) Revenues or incur Active Section 7(i) Costs through 
the operations of Tanana Asbestos Corp., its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, as Lessee under such lease.182 
The agreement to treat revenues and expenses as passive, in this 
particular case, is the opposite of the treatment that those revenues and 
expenses would otherwise receive under the Agreement given Doyon’s 
100% ownership of Tanana Asbestos Corp.183 
Second, the Agreement addresses a settlement payment between 
Chugach Natives, Inc. and the United States that concluded in summer 
1982.184 According to the settlement, Chugach had the “choice of 
accepting $12 million or exercising certain timber cutting rights within a 
National Forest.”185 Chugach chose the $12 million, but that raised the 
question of whether part, or all, of the $12 million was shareable.186 Under 
the Agreement, a compromise was reached providing that the first 
$2,460,014 “was used to eliminate Chugach’s carry-forward of past 
deductions [under Article VII, section 5],” but the remaining $9,539,986 
was non-shareable.187 
 
 
 
 
 180.  Id. at 112. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See Lazarus Memo, supra note 43, at 5–6 (explaining the rationale behind 
Appendix B of Agreement to Doyon Board of Directors). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See id. at 6 (further explaining details of Appendix B); Settlement 
Agreement, supra note 2, at 86, 112. 
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III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Since the finalization of the Settlement Agreement in the early 1980s, 
all three relevant constituencies—village corporations, individual at-large 
shareholders, and regional corporations—have challenged the 
Agreement in court. 
Concurrent with the finalization and court-approval of the 
Settlement Agreement in 1982 to 1983, several village corporations sought 
to intervene in the litigation to protect their interests in the Aleut case.188 
This happened in May 1982, just one month prior to the culmination of 
the multi-year effort to finalize the Settlement Agreement.189 In February 
1983, the district court denied the motion, ruling that it was untimely.190 
In affirming the district court decision, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
We reach this conclusion on the assumption that the regions did 
not represent the villages in the section 7(i) litigation. . . . Our 
assumption that the villages were not represented by the regions 
would, were it to be determined to be correct, enable the villages 
to challenge the applicability of Chugach to dually owned land 
as well as the settlement agreement to the extent it affected their 
interests.191 
In 1989, following several years of arbitration interpreting the 
provisions of the Settlement Agreement regarding timber harvest, 
Sealaska filed suit in federal district court.192 Sealaska asked the court to 
issue a preliminary injunction while simultaneously asking the court to 
reopen the earlier Aleut cases and set aside the arbitration decisions.193 
Meanwhile, the prevailing regional corporations filed a case in Alaska 
state court to enforce the arbitration award.194 Sealaska removed the state 
court case to federal district court and all of the issues were decided 
together.195 The federal district court upheld the binding nature of the 
arbitration provisions of the Settlement Agreement and rejected 
Sealaska’s other arguments, which attempted to re-litigate issues 
addressed in the arbitration.196 The court noted that the “corporations 
 
 188.  Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 725 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 189.  Id. at 528–29. 
 190.  Id. at 529. 
 191.  Id. at 530 (referencing Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 
(9th Cir. 1979)). It should be noted that the court made no holding with respect to 
whether the villages were represented by the regions. Id. 
 192.  Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515, at 7–8 (Jan. 24, 1989) (on file with authors); see 
also Schutt, supra note 5, at 261–62 (summarizing timber harvest litigation). 
 193.  See Aleut VI, Civ. No. A88-515, at 7–8. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. at 8–9. 
 196.  Id. at 9–20. 
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intended the Agreement to be a definitive declaration of their revenue 
sharing obligations under Section 7(i)” and that “signators included . . . a 
binding arbitration clause which provides only for limited judicial 
review.”197 The court concluded that Sealaska’s decision “was an 
informed and intelligent waiver of its right to argue in this forum that a 
particular method for determining fair market value violates ANCSA.”198 
Furthermore, in 1994, in Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. 
v. Ahtna, Inc. (Bay View I), a village corporation in the Bristol Bay region 
and Lewis Olsen, an individual at-large shareholder of Bristol Bay Native 
Corporation, brought suit claiming that ANCSA Sections 7(i) and 7(j) 
required ten regional corporations to share proceeds from the sale of net 
operating losses (NOLs)—a tax benefit largely derived from the unique 
structure of a regional corporation’s options for setting the tax basis for 
its resource properties.199 The NOL tie to 7(i) resources was the genesis of 
the Bay View I challenge as well as other similar litigation. An Anchorage 
Times story in 1989 explained NOLs and their history with Alaska Native 
corporations: 
In 1984, Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, persuaded Congress to help 
the native corporations by inserting a special tax break into that 
year’s tax reform act. . . . [T]he break has allowed the 
corporations to earn more than $500 million by selling past 
operating and paper losses to high-profit Lower 48 corporations 
looking for ways to reduce their tax bills. 
 
Those corporations were allowed to apply the losses against 
their profits; they then passed up to 80 percent of the resultant 
tax savings on to their native corporate partners.200 
NOL sales were a major boost to the profits of a number of regional 
corporations in the late 1980s—a time when many were struggling 
financially.201 
 
 
 
 
 
 197.  Id. at 5–6. 
 198.  Id. at 17. 
 199.  Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc. (Bay View I), 
Civ. No. A94-0551, at 4 (D. Alaska July 6, 1995) (unreported mem. op.) (on file 
with authors). 
 200.  Bob Ortega, Calista Wants Cut of Tax Sales, ANCHORAGE TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, 
at A-1, A-10. 
 201.  See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Profits Soar for Native Corporations, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 1989, at C-1, C-2 (on file with authors). 
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Both plaintiffs in the Bay View I case sought to represent classes, the 
village corporations and the at-large shareholders, respectively.202 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the NOLs that the ten regional corporations sold 
derived from losses attributable to natural resources and were therefore 
subject to Section 7(i).203 
The issue of NOLs and the applicability of Section 7(i) had been 
brewing for several years during the pendency of the NOL transactions 
of the late 1980s.204 In late 1990, CIRI’s President, Roy Huhndorf, wrote a 
letter to each of the other regional corporations’ CEOs urging that they 
reach a consensus position on the NOL issue.205 Mr. Huhndorf noted “[i]f  
you did an NOL deal and didn’t share the proceeds under 7(i) (which is  
true of everyone but NANA), you have already made the decision that 
NOL’s are not shareable.”206 
In the Bay View I litigation, the regional corporation defendants 
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs, specifically raising the question 
of whether either plaintiff could bring a direct private right of action 
against regional corporations outside the Bristol Bay region.207 
The court noted that Section 7(i) is “qualified by subsections 7(ℓ) and 
7(m). These subsections allow a regional corporation to use some or all of 
its subsection 7(j) funds for joint ventures between the village 
corporations in that region and the regional corporation, or for use by the 
regional corporation for projects that will benefit the region generally.”208 
“Inasmuch as subsection 7(i) entitles all 12 regional corporations to 
a share in resource revenues, and since regional corporations are entitled 
to retain a significant percentage of those revenues . . . it follows that each 
regional corporation has a very significant, direct financial interest in 
assuring the receipt of what is due it under subsection 7(i).”209 
The court found that with respect to at-large shareholder plaintiff 
Olsen, there was no direct cause of action.210 The court found that the 
“most obvious indication of this conclusion is the language of ANCSA 
itself,” which provides for no such right, despite expressly providing for 
 
 202.  See Bay View I, Civ. No. A94-0551, at 7. 
 203.  See id. at 4–5. 
 204.  See Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps., 105 F.3d at 1283–84 
(describing NOL background and history); Schutt, supra note 5, at 259–60 
(describing history of NOL litigation). 
 205.  Letter from Roy M. Huhndorf, President, CIRI, to Reg’l Corp. CEOs (Oct. 
24, 1990) (on file with authors). 
 206.  Id. at 2. 
 207.  See Bay View I, Civ. No. A94-0551, at 7. 
 208.  Id. at 8 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i), (ℓ), (m)). 
 209.  Id. at 13. 
 210.  See id. at 11–12. 
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other litigation rights within the Act.211 Instead, the court noted that “it is 
the Bristol Bay Native Corporation which is entitled to receive subsection 
7(i) proceeds and that corporate entity is answerable to Mr. Olsen for his 
rights as an at large shareholder.”212 
Similarly, the court found that Congress did not create a direct cause 
of action for a village corporation against regional corporations outside of 
its region.213 In reaching its conclusion, the court repeatedly noted 
Congress’s directive that ANCSA “be effected ‘without litigation.’”214 
While it ultimately dismissed the action, the court did “assume[] without 
deciding that there is at least the possibility of a state law cause of action 
by villages against their regional corporation for failure to enforce rights 
under ANCSA as to which the villages have a direct, beneficial 
interest.”215 
On appeal, the litigation focus changed dramatically as Congress 
had amended ANCSA Section 7(i) to clarify that NOL sales were not 
subject to Section 7(i) sharing.216 
A few years later in Oliver v. Sealaska Corp.,217 an at-large shareholder 
of Sealaska and CIRI sued each of the regional corporations.218 The 
plaintiff “challenge[d] the legality of Article IV and Article II, Subsection 
6(g) of the Settlement Agreement.”219 He sought a court ruling that “it was 
an ultra vires action of the corporations to agree to these terms because 
the terms wrongly limit the village corporations’ and at-large 
shareholders’ rights to shareable revenues under ANCSA subsection 
7(i).”220 In short, Oliver attempted a direct attack on the Settlement 
 
 211.  Id. at 11. 
 212.  Id. at 12. 
 213.  Id. at 11. 
 214.  Id. at 11–13. 
 215.  Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
 216.  Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting “Congress made the 1995 Amendment fully 
retroactive” and the court therefore “need not decide whether village 
corporations or at-large shareholders have an implied right of action to enforce 
section 7(i) in federal court.”); see also Bay View, Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 
494, 497 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2000) (“The court concludes, on the basis of section 1606(i)’s 
plain language, that NOL revenues were not shareable revenues under section 
1606(i) as enacted. . . . Accordingly, . . . Congress took nothing when it enacted the 
1995 amendment clarifying that NOL revenues were not shareable revenues.”). 
 217.  Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, slip op. (D. Alaska Sept. 24, 
1997) (on file with authors). 
 218.  Id. at 1–2 (on file with authors). 
 219.  Id. at 11. Article IV is titled “Calculation of Distributable Revenues.” 
Article II, subsection 6(g) is the language addressing land exchanges of surface 
estate for surface estate, subsurface estate, or both, and excluding it from revenue 
sharing. 
 220.  Id. at 11–12. 
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Agreement and the legality of the regional corporations entering into the 
Agreement without direct representation of village corporations and at-
large shareholders in the negotiations. 
The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding “that plaintiff 
may not bring a direct cause of action under [Alaska Statute] 10.06.015.”221 
The court went on to explain “a second reason” for the dismissal that: 
[R]elates to the very fact that there has been over twenty years 
of litigation on the reach of ANCSA subsection 7(i). . . . 
Subsection 7(i) is, very simply put, a problem; it is a problem that 
affects regional corporations, village corporations, and at-large 
shareholders in a variety of ways. It is inappropriate for a 
problem that affects everybody to be brought in a private, direct 
action by a single shareholder with no claim against anyone but 
his own two regional corporations.222 
The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees to the defendant 
regional corporations under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82.223 The 
court concluded that an award of fees under Alaska law was appropriate 
despite the fact that “the case [wa]s before th[e] court on removal because 
of federal question jurisdiction.”224 The court noted that “Oliver’s 
complaint was founded upon the doctrine of ultra vires corporate conduct 
and was brought on the basis of [Alaska Statute] 10.06.015,” and held that 
where Alaska substantive law was the basis of the dispute, the availability 
of attorneys’ fees under Alaska substantive law was appropriate.225 This 
was an important ruling for regional corporations because Alaska Rule 82 
helps prevent unfounded or repetitive litigation by assessing a portion of 
the winning party’s attorneys’ fees to the loser. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision holding that 
“nothing in the text of the revenue-sharing provision creates an express 
private right of action to enforce the section’s mandates” and finding that 
the factors test regarding whether a private right of action may be implied 
by the statutory text did not in fact support any such right of action.226 
Similarly, in Dagg v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.,227 an at-large 
shareholder of Cook Inlet Region, Inc. sought to institute a class action 
“against ASRC to recover funds which he contend[ed] were not shared 
with the other regional corporations as required by [Section 7(i)]” and to 
 
 221.  Id. at 14. 
 222.  Id. at 17. 
 223.  Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., Civ. No. A96-0343, slip op. at 20–21 (D. Alaska 
Feb. 9, 1998) (on file with authors). 
 224.  Id. at 6. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.   Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220, 1223–25 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 227.  Civ. No. A94-044 (May 2, 1994) (on file with authors). 
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set aside the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement.228 The court dismissed the 
action holding “[t]his is not a derivative suit and Congress did not give 
individual shareholders a private right of action to enforce corporate 
opportunities.”229 
IV. TIME FOR AMENDMENT? 
The parties to the Settlement Agreement have only amended the 
complex document twice in thirty-five years.230 In the intervening time, 
statutory amendments enacted by Congress to Section 7(i), as well as 
court decisions, as discussed herein, have changed the landscape upon 
which the Settlement Agreement was concluded. This section, therefore, 
proposes several potential subjects that might be worthy of review and 
amendment. 
A main reason to amend the Agreement is to modernize it. For 
example, the current notice provision of the Agreement requires: “All 
notices . . . shall be in writing and shall be communicated to the 
Corporations by certified mail, return receipt requested.”231 The 
Settlement Agreement does not include a provision allowing for 
electronic communication of required notice. 
Another area ripe for modernization is the constant dollar provision 
of section 5 in Article VIII. That provision provides for inflationary 
adjustment of dollar figures in various provisions of the Agreement like 
the standard deduction of $300,000 per year for general and 
administrative costs in Article III, section 1(c).232 While, the five-year 
inflationary adjustment has provided for increasing the dollar amounts, 
the corporations themselves have also grown significantly in the more 
than three decades since the Settlement Agreement was executed. As 
such, merely adjusting for inflation from time-to-time has not matched 
the economic realities of the regional corporations’ growth, which has far 
outpaced inflation. That growth, and changing conditions generally, may 
warrant adjustments of some of the provisions providing specific dollar 
amounts. 
Another obvious choice for modernization of the Agreement would 
be incorporating amendments to ANCSA that affect Section 7(i) into the 
Agreement itself. For example, despite an amendment to ANCSA Section 
 
 
 228.  Id. at 1. 
 229.  Id. at 1–2. 
 230.  See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text. 
 231.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 95–96. 
 232.  Id. at 38. 
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7(i) in 1995 specifically addressing tax benefits,233 and a Ninth Circuit case 
involving the issue,234 the regional corporations have not amended the 
Agreement to address tax benefits arising from natural resource 
development, including net operating losses, depletion allowances, and 
various forms of tax credits.235 
Similarly, although a congressional amendment to ANCSA has 
rendered sand, gravel, and rock non-shareable, the Agreement still 
includes a provision addressing the sharing of revenue from sand, gravel 
and rock.236 The Agreement’s provision even anticipated the 1998 
congressional amendment to ANCSA that made sand, gravel, and rock 
non-shareable.237 
There have also been new developments that apply to ANCSA land, 
which the parties to the Agreement could not have possibly contemplated 
in 1982. One example is the expansion of various types of legal entities 
recognized by state and federal laws in the time since 1982. The 
Agreement recognizes corporations, partnerships, and trusts, but it did 
not anticipate limited liability companies, limited partnerships, or other 
corporate forms legally recognized more recently than 1982.238 As a 
related matter, the complexity of ordinary business transactions 
regarding capital-intensive developments has blossomed in recent years. 
The relatively simplistic approach of the Agreement may not be adequate 
should a dispute arise regarding the treatment of previously uncommon 
(or non-existent) uses of financial mechanisms, such as preferred equity 
 
 
 
 233.  Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, sec. 109, § 7(i), 109 Stat. 353, 357 
(1995) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ does not include any 
benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or credits earned by a 
Regional Corporation.”). 
 234.  See Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1281 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court dismissal of suit challenging 1995 
amendment as unconstitutional taking). 
 235.  Doyon and other regions identified the benefit of the resource-owning 
region keeping full depletion allowances under the Internal Revenue Code within 
a few years of ANCSA. In a 1976 memorandum to the Doyon Board, John Sackett 
stated Doyon’s position on the issue: “[O]ther regions do not have a sufficient 
economic interest in the resources in place to warrant the depletion pass through.” 
Memorandum from John Sackett, President, Doyon, Ltd., to Doyon Bd. of Dirs., 
at 2 (May 16, 1976) (on file with authors). 
 236.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 35. 
 237.  See id. (anticipating congressional action); see also ANCSA Land Bank 
Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-333, § 8, 112 Stat. 3129, 3134 (codifed at 
ANCSA § 7(i), 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)). The Agreement references sand, gravel, and 
rock one other time in Article III, § 3(c)(i)(C). Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, 
at 44, Article III, § 3(c)(i)(C). 
 238.  Settlement Agreement, supra note 2, at 8. 
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or back leverage, in determining whether a regional corporation’s 
participation should be treated under the Agreement’s active or passive 
rules. 
The Agreement also did not anticipate the sale of conservation 
easements.239 Conservation easements are transactions where a 
landowner will retain ownership of a parcel of land but permanently 
restrict development of that land.240 Often, though not always, the 
landowner will receive a tax benefit in exchange for the conservation 
easement.241 Conservation easements have not been tested in the context 
of Section 7(i), although there have been several recent transactions 
involving ANCSA lands.242 Because of the 1995 amendments to ANCSA, 
specifically amending Section 7(i) to address tax benefits, it is clear that 
Section 7(i) does not require sharing in a conservation easement 
transaction where the only benefit received by the regional corporation 
landowner is a tax benefit.243 Regional corporations should consider 
amending the Agreement to reflect this result. In addition, the Agreement 
could address the situation where a regional corporation receives cash or 
some other benefit in exchange for part or all of a conservation easement. 
Finally, the regional corporations should address carbon credit 
transactions in any amendment. “A forest carbon offset, is a metric ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)—the emission of which is avoided or 
newly stored—that is purchased by greenhouse gas emitters to 
compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere.”244 In 2015, the California 
Air Resources Board extended the geographic area of forested lands 
 
 239.  See Schutt, supra note 5, at 269 (explaining that “conservation easements 
have not been tested in the context of Section 7(i)”). 
 240.  See Internal Revenue Service, Conservation Easement Audit Techniques 
Guide (revised Jan. 3, 2012) (defining “conservation easement”) (on file with 
authors). 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  See Pedro Bay Corporation Conservation Easement Project Description, PEDRO 
BAY CORP., http://www.pedrobaycorp.com/index.php/latest-news/310-pedro-
bay-corporation-conservation-easement-project-description (last visited Sept. 14, 
2017) (describing Pedro Bay Corporation’s efforts to establish conservation 
easements on parts of its land); Agulowak Conservation Easement, BRISTOL BAY 
HERITAGE LAND TRUST, http://www.bristolbaylandtrust.org/agulowak-
conservation-easement (last visited June 17, 2017) (describing a conservation 
easement established on Native land by Aleknagik Native LTD). 
 243.  ANCSA § 7(i)(2) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ 
does not include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or 
credits earned by a Regional Corporation.”); see also Bay View, Inc. v. U.S., 278 
F.3d 1259, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 244.  Christine Yankel, FAQ Forest Carbon Projects, THE CLIMATE TRUST (Aug. 1, 
2014), http://www.climatetrust.org/forest-carbon-projects-faq/ (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Schutt supra note 5, at 268–69 (describing forest 
carbon offsets and their potential treatment under ANCSA’s revenue sharing 
provision). 
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eligible to participate in its program to include the southeast and southern 
coastal areas in Alaska that are not in National Forests.245 Several regional 
corporations are pursuing transactions involving the forest carbon 
projects on ANCSA lands.246 While this issue is likely to be contentious, a 
negotiated set of rules would make future transactions much more 
predictable and less risky to regions considering those or similar 
transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
The ANCSA Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement has withstood the 
test of time. Thirty-five years after it ended a persistent cycle of litigation, 
and twenty-five years after several arbitration cases tested its provisions, 
the ANCSA regional corporation parties to the Agreement have benefited  
from a long period of certainty around resource development on ANCSA 
lands. 
The parties clearly anticipated that the Settlement Agreement would 
be a living document that could be amended to address unanticipated 
issues as they arose. Yet, in the thirty-five years since the effective date of 
the Agreement, the regional corporations have only agreed to amend the 
Agreement twice. Given the many changes in the intervening decades, it 
is time that the regional corporations closely study amending the 
Agreement to reflect modern transactions and changes. That effort could 
provide another long period of certainty under the grand compromise 
which was the Settlement Agreement. 
 
 
 
 245.  Cal. Air. Res. Bd., Compliance Offset Protocol U.S. Forest Offset Projects (last 
updated Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/ 
usforest/usforestprojects_2015.htm. 
 246.  See Ahtna Kanas, AHTNA, INC., at 5 (Winter 2016), http://ahtna-
inc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/AHA020-4th-Quarter-2016_web.pdf 
(describing Ahtna’s ongoing efforts to sell carbon stocks). 
